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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STEVEN H. SWAYNE,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
Case No. 880177-CA
L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES,
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE,

Category No. 7

Defendants/Respondents.
PETITION FOR REHEARING

Plaintiff and Appellant requests that a rehearing be
granted in this action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 35 of
the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.

This petition is made

for the reason that the Court misapprehended the Petitioner's
claims in two ways.

First, the Court overlooked the fact that

Mr. Swayne has adopted his infant daughter by acknowledgement
and, therefore, Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4(3) (Rep.Vol. 9 1987)
cannot be applied as a basis for terminating his parental
rights.

Second, the Court erred in holding that Mr. Swayne had

no parental rights subject: to termination.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY
POINT I*

AS STEVEN SWAYNE ADOPTED HIS DAUGHTER BY
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4(3)
CANNOT BE THE BASIS FOR TERMINATION OF HIS
PARENTAL RIGHTS
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-12 (Rep.Vol. 9 1987) provides

that the father of an illegitimate child can legitimate the
child "from the time of its birthM by publicly acknowledging
his paternity and receiving it into his family.

Steven Swayne

has satisfied these statutory requirements for his daughter,
and had done so prior to her relinquishment by her natural
mother.

Accordingly, the provisions of Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-30-4(3) (Rep.Vol. 9 1987) are not applicable to Mr. Swayne
because he is not the father of an illegitimate child.
Both in the trial court and in this Court (Appellant's
Brief at pp. 15-18), Steven Swayne asserted that he did all
that was required to adopt his daughter by acknowledgement.

He

openly acknowledged his paternity, was present at birth,
visited her in the hospital, took the child into his home and
family and treated her in all ways as his legitimate
offspring.

Thus, as a different panel of this Court held in In

Re T.R.F. v. Felan,

P.2d

, 90 UAR 36 (Utah App. 1988),

M

any filing of a petition for adoption after an unwed father

has met the statutory requirement, and with only the mother's
consent, is a legal nullity.11

90 UAR at 39.

The trial court

made no finding on this issue, however, because Mr. Swayne
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didn't file an acknowledgement of paternity before
relinquishment, and, as the Utah Supreme Court held,
unequivocally, in Ellis v. Social Services Dep't. of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah
1980), Min order to protect his rights under U.C.A., 1953,
78-30-12, the putative father must file a(notice of paternity
with the Bureau."

615 P.2d at 1254. Obviously, the "rights"

referred to could only require protection if the statutory
requirements had already been met, otherwise there would be no
"rights" to protect.
T.R.F. rejected this holding, however, because to
actually apply the requirement of filing $ notice would be
unconstitutional.

"The language of Ellis need not be read, and

indeed cannot constitutionally be read, t<> require a putative
father to file a notice of paternity priof to the filing of the
petition for adoption in a case such as this when the putative
father has previously acknowledged the chf.ld within the meaning
of the acknowledgement statute."

90 UAR kt 39.

Therefore, in

T.R.F., another panel of this Court noted the very problem in
the Ellis reasoning which Mr. Swayne presented in his brief and
simply chose to "modify" that portion of the opinion which
expressly required the filing of a notice!of paternity before
relinquishment in every case where the father of the
illegitimate child sought to protect his parental rights.
Under the law as announced in T.R.F., before the defendants in

this case would have been entitled to summary judgment in the
Court below they would have had to establish that Mr. Swayne
had not adopted his daughter by acknowledgement.

If he had,

then T.R.F. expressly holds just what Mr. Swayne has asserted
below and in this Court, that it would be constitutionally
impermissible to apply the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-30-4(3) to him.
In Swayne, this Court stated if Man unwed father
establishes a substantial relationship over a number of years'*
he is protected by 78-30-12.

However, the statute requires no

such duration for the relationship (which it would be
manifestly impossible to have with a five-day-old child).

It

only requires "(1) public acknowledgement by the father, (2)
receipt of the child into the father's family and (3) treatment
of the child as legitimate."

T.R.F., supra., at 38. That

panel of this Court acknowledged that this statute, and others
like it, have always been given liberal construction and only
require public acknowledgement by the father to his family and
friends that the child is his, coupled with visits with the
child in his home or wherever the child resides, no matter how
brief.

The uncontradicted evidence in this case demonstrated

that Mr. Swayne publicly acknowledged his paternity both before
and after the child's birth.
baby shower for the mother.

He informed his family who held a
He was present at the birth of the

child in the delivery room where he claimed paternity.
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He

visited the child every day it was in the hospital and also in
his own home.

He expressed willingness to take the child if

the mother chose to relinquish custody.

Whether the Court

finds his actions toward the child's mother laudable or not is
irrelevant.

The judgment entered below cannot be sustained

consistently with the law as announced in T.R.F., nor can the
statute be applied constitutionally if the holding of T.R.F. is
ignored.
In this action, this Court should either find as a
matter of law that the undisputed facts demonstrate adoption by
acknowledgement and reverse the judgment below or should
reverse the judgment and remand for findings on the question of
Mr. Swayne's compliance with the adoption by acknowledgement
statute.
POINT II.

AN UNWED FATHER HAS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED
RIGHTS IN HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS NEWBORN
INFANT.
I

This Court's rejection of Mr. Swayne's substantive due
process claim was based upon the holding ihat the "statute
cannot create an irrebuttable presumption of abandonment where
parental rights do not exist."

Slip.Op. it 12. The assertion

that a biological father of a newborn illegitimate child has no
parental rights is totally inconsistent with the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248
(1983), where the Court explained at some length that the
biological father has a constitutionally protected interest in
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being accorded the opportunity to form a true parental
relationship with his child.

Whether this right is

characterized as an "inchoate right" or an "opportunity
interest" is unimportant.

What is important is that it cannot

be forfeited in a manner which does not comply with due
process.

Therefore, this Court's assertion that an unwed

father "does not have parental rights subject to termination
until he asserts them" is flatly inconsistent with the teaching
of Lehr.
Finally, this Court's "finding" that Mr. Swayne had
actual knowledge of the requirement to register his paternity
to protect his parental rights (Slip.Op. at 15) is contrary to
all the evidence and a prior stipulation of the parties.

This

Court is not free to make factual findings inconsistent with
the evidence, apparently basing its "finding" on the lack of
credibility of a witness never seen nor heard.
The Court's further assertion that Mr. Swayne must
have known of the registration procedure because of his prior
relinquishment of a different child must be based on
assumptions which are neither of record nor true.

Mr. Swayne's

prior relinquishment occurred when L.D.S. Social Services
solicited his consent to placement of a child born in
New Mexico, who he had not publicly acknowledged as his child.
He never filed any form of registration as the child's parent,
yet his consent for adoption was sought.
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If this experience

imparts any knowledge it would be that an unwed father's
consent is always required.

This Court's "finding" that

Mr. Swayne's prior experience imparted knowledge of the Utah
filing requirement is extrinsic to the record, was not
advocated by the respondents, and is simpiy wrong.
CONCLUSION
When Mr. Swayne filed the present action he alleged he
was the child's natural father, that he h^d publicly
acknowledged this fact and that in the brief period between the
child's birth and her surrender to strangers he had as
substantial a relationship as one can with a five-day-old
baby.

He alleged that these facts entitled him to custody.

He

argued in the trial court that he had done all that Utah Code
Ann. § 78-30-12 required to adopt by acknowledgement and that
§ 78-30-4(3) could not be constitutionally applied to him as a
basis for terminating his parental rights.

The decision of

this Court, while not addressing Mr. Swayne's compliance with
the provisions of § 78-30-12, simply assumes that he had no
rights under that statute.

Such a presumption is erroneous and

requires rehearing and reversal of the judgment entered below
as occurred in T.R.F.
DATED this d*L»J day of September, 1988.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

M. Dgvid Ecker
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Billfe/L. Walker/et. /
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
CERTIFICATION OF GOOD FAITH
M. David Eckersley, counsel for Plaintiff and
Appellant, hereby certifies, pursuant to the provisions of Rule
35(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, that this
Petition for Rehearing is filed in good faith and not for delay.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that, on the £X~

day of September,

1988, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, four true and
correct copies of the foregoing PETITION FOR REHEARING to the
following:
David M. McConkie
Merrill F. Nelson
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents

0057d
092188
7878-1.2

-8-

